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Abstract. We give a simple intuitionistic completeness proof of Kripke
semantics with constant domain for intuitionistic logic with implication
and universal quantification. We use a cut-free intuitionistic sequent cal-
culus as formal system and by combining soundness with completeness,
we obtain an executable cut-elimination procedure. The proof, which has
been formalised in the Coq proof assistant, easily extends to the case of
the absurdity connective using Kripke models with exploding nodes.
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1 Introduction
The intuitionistic completeness proofs for intuitionistic full first-order predicate
logic given by Veldman [1] and Friedman [2, Chapter 13] use nonstandard Kripke
model and Beth model, respectively (the false formula may be forced at some
nodes). Both the proof of Veldman and that of Friedman work by building a
model made of infinite contexts. Especially, they had to deal with language
extensions and work with spreads in order to meet some closure conditions for
disjunction and existential quantification:
– Γ ⊢ A ∨ B implies Γ ⊢ A or Γ ⊢ B.
– Γ ⊢ ∃x A(x) implies Γ ⊢ A(c) for some constant c.
Note however that this is not only the case for intuitionistic proofs, but also
the case for a classical, Henkin-type proof given in Troelstra and van Dalen [2,
Chapter 2].
On the other hand, C. Coquand [3] shows that an intuitionistic proof for
intuitionistic propositional logic with implication as a sole logical symbol can be
obtained in a much simpler way by building a universal model made of finite
contexts of formulae. She gave a mechanised proof of the completeness proof and
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even got a cut-elimination proof by using some interpreter and inversion func-
tions, a method called “normalisation by evaluation” in general, cf. [4]. They
correspond to the soundness and the completeness, respectively, of the propo-
sitional logic with implication as sole connective w.r.t. Kripke semantics. The
completeness result there is strong in two ways: in the traditional sense that it
holds in arbitrary contexts (see [2]) and in a sense (due to Okada [5]) that it
builds normal proofs. In this paper, we extend C. Coquand’s idea to the intu-
itionistic first-order predicate logic with implication and universal quantification
as logical symbols.
The predicate system used here is a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. The ad-
vantage is that the notion of normal proofs is easy to define: one just has to
remove the cut rule. More precisely, the calculus we consider is the intuitionis-
tic restriction LJT of a sequent calculus named LKT that Danos et al [6] de-
rived from an analytical decomposition of Gentzen’s LK within Girard’s Linear
Logic [7]. LKT is a constrained variant of LK. Its main property is the bijective
correspondence between its set of cut-free proofs and the set of normal forms3 of
classical natural deduction [8]. LJT itself is a constrained variant of LJ and its
main property is the bijective correspondence between its set of cut-free proofs
and the set of normal forms of natural deduction [9,10]. By choosing LJT and
its cut-free variant as our reference calculus, we emphasise that our complete-
ness theorem builds not any arbitrary proofs but cut-free ones in a subset of LJ
which bijectively maps to normal natural deduction proofs (and hence to normal
λ-terms).
We show that the strong completeness holds both for the system with or
without (⊥i). In case of with (⊥i), we adopt Veldman’s modified Kripke se-
mantics. Both proofs are intuitionistic and almost the same. Therefore, we can
get a very simple cut-elimination proofs as a by-product at the end. A main
difference compared with Veldman’s or Friedman’s proof is that we deal with
contexts made of formulae, not just of sentences, therefore we need to handle
substitutions.
The Kripke models we are considering are Kripke models with constant do-
main, i.e. with the domain function D being the same for every world:
D = D(w) for all w.
As a consequence, in the case of universal quantification, considering of all pos-
sible future worlds is not necessary and the following simpler definition
w  ∀x A(x) iff, for all d ∈ D, w  A(d).
gets equivalent, by monotonicity of forcing and invariance of the domain, to the
standard definition:
w  ∀x A(x) iff, for all w′ ≥ w and for all d ∈ D, w′  A(d).
3 To be precise: normal forms along a call-by-name reduction semantics.
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This paper is organised as follows. We first prove the soundness of the Kripke
semantics with respect to cut-free LJT. Then give a intuitionistic strong com-
pleteness proof which results in the intuitionistic completeness proof. Finally, an
intuitionistic cut-elimination process is described.
2 The sequent calculus LJT
Let L = L(C, F, P) be a first-order language with an infinite set C of individ-
ual constants, among them a distinguished constant c0, a non-empty set F of
functions, and a non-empty set P of predicates. The logical symbols are the impli-
cation → and the universal quantification ∀. We assume furthermore that there
are countably many free variables. Terms, formulae and sentences are defined in
the usual way. We follow the convention that A(x) denotes the formula A where
the variable x might appear. Any two formulae are considered identical when
they are different only in names for bound variables. A variable or a constant is
called fresh in a formula A or a context Γ when it does not occur free or at all,
respectively.
Definition 1 (Simultaneous substitutions). Let ρ be a function from finite
set of variables to the set of terms.
1. Given a term t, t[.\ρ] is inductively defined:
– x[.\ρ] =
{
ρ(x) if x ∈ dom(ρ),
x otherwise.
– c[.\ρ] = c for any c ∈ C.
– (f t1 · · · tn)[.\ρ] = f (t1[.\ρ]) · · · (tn[.\ρ]).
2. Given a formula A, A[.\ρ] is inductively defined:
– (P t1 · · · tn)[.\ρ] = P (t1[.\ρ]) · · · (tn[.\ρ]).
– (A → B)[.\ρ] = (A[.\ρ] → (B[.\ρ]).
– (∀x A)[.\ρ] = ∀x (A[.\ρ−x]).
Here ρ−x denotes the function obtained from ρ with dom(ρ−x) = dom(ρ)\{x},
i.e., if y ∈ dom(ρ) and x 6= y, then ρ−x(y) = ρ(y) and undefined otherwise.
We also take care of variable capture by changing bound variables when nec-
essary.
Given a formula A(x), we use Ax(t) or A[x\t] for A[.\ρ] where ρ = {(x, t)}.
We also consider substitution of a term t for a constant c in a similar way and
use the notation Ac(t).
The Gentzen-style sequence calculus LJT is obtained from the intuitionistic
sequent calculus LJ by restricting the use of the left introduction rules of the im-
plication and the universal quantification. See Table 1 for the cut-free fragment.
In that way, one can get a one-to-one correspondence between cut-free proofs in
LJT and normal terms in λ-style calculus.
In LJT, a sequent has one of the forms Γ ;A ⊢ C or Γ ⊢ C, where Γ is a
list of formulae. That is, the location of a formula occurring multiple times is
important. The right side of “;” in the antecedence is called stoup . Γ, Γ ′, ∆, ...
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Γ ; A ⊢ A
(Ax)
Γ ; A ⊢ C A ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ C
(Contr)
Γ ⊢ A Γ ; B ⊢ C
Γ ; A → B ⊢ C
(→ℓ)
A, Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A → B
(→r)
Γ ; Ax(t) ⊢ C
Γ ; ∀x A(x) ⊢ C
(∀ℓ)
Γ ⊢ A(x) x fresh in Γ
Γ ⊢ ∀x A
(∀r)
Table 1. Cut-free LJT
vary over lists of formulae. We write A ∈ Γ when A occurs in Γ . Γ ⊑ ∆ denotes
that, for all A, A ∈ Γ implies A ∈ ∆. Γc(t) is obtained from Γ by replacing each
formula A with Ac(t).
Lemma 2 (Weakening and Exchange). Let A, C be formulae and Γ, Γ ′ two
contexts such that Γ ⊑ Γ ′.
1. Γ ⊢ C implies Γ ′ ⊢ C.
2. Γ ;A ⊢ C implies Γ ′ ;A ⊢ C.
Proof. One can easily prove both claims by a simultaneous induction on the
deduction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a context, A, C formulae, and c a constant.
1. Γ ⊢ C implies Γc(y) ⊢ Cc(y) for any variable y which is not bound in Γ,A.
2. Γ ;A ⊢ C implies Γc(y) ;Ac(y) ⊢ Cc(y) for any variable y which is not bound
in Γ,A, C.
Proof. By a simple simultaneous induction on deduction. ⊓⊔
The following lemma says that a fresh constant is as good as a fresh variable
and will play an important role in the proof of the strong completeness.
Lemma 4. Given a context Γ , a formula A(x), and a constant c fresh in Γ and
A(x), Γ ⊢ Ax(c) implies Γ ⊢ Ax(y) for any variable y which is not bound in
Γ,A.
Proof. It follows directly from the lemma just before. ⊓⊔
3 Kripke semantics
Kripke semantics was created in the late 1950s and early 1960s by Saul Kripke
[11,12]. It was first made for modal logic, and later adapted to intuitionistic logic
and other non-classical systems. In this section we discuss Kripke models for the
first-order predicate logic with implication and universal quantification as sole
logical symbols and their connection with intuitionistic validity.
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Definition 5. A Kripke model is a quadruple K = (W,≤,,D, V ), W inhab-
ited, such that
1. (W,≤) is a partially ordered set.
2. D is an inhabited set, called the domain of K.
3. Let the language be extended with constant symbols for each element of D.
Then  is a relation between W and the set of prime sentences in the ex-
tended language such that
(w ≤ w′ ∧ w  P d1 · · · dn) ⇒ w
′
 P d1 · · · dn
where w, w′ ∈ W, P ∈ P, d1, ..., dn ∈ D, and n = arity(P ).
4. V is a function such that
– V (c) ∈ D for all c ∈ C.
– V (f) : Darity(f) → D for all f ∈ F.
An association ρ based on K is a function from a finite set of variables to D.
Given an association ρ, each term has an interpretation in D:
– x [ρ] =
{
ρ(x) if x ∈ dom(ρ),
V (c0) otherwise.
– c [ρ] = V (c) for any c ∈ C.
– (f t1 · · · tℓ) [ρ] = V (f)(t1 [ρ]) · · · (tℓ [ρ]).
The forcing relation is then inductively extended by the forthcoming clauses
to all L-formulae.
– w  (P t1 · · · tn)[ρ] iff w  P (t1 [ρ]) · · · (tn [ρ]).
– w  (A → B)[ρ] iff, for all w′ ≥ w, if w′  A [ρ], then w′  B [ρ].
– w  (∀x A)[ρ] iff, for all d ∈ D, w  A [ρ(x 7→ d)].
Here ρ(x 7→ d) denotes the association ρ′ such that ρ′(y) = ρ(y) if y 6= x and
ρ′(x) = d. The definition of forcing is extended to contexts as follows:
w  Γ [ρ] iff w  A [ρ] for all A ∈ Γ ,
Remark 6. There are two points to be mentioned.
1. The forcing relation is upward monotone, i.e., if w ≤ w′ and w  A [ρ], then
w′  A [ρ].
2. As mentioned in the introduction, the forcing definition at the universal
quantification case is much simpler than the usual definition, where the do-
main depends on worlds:
w  (∀x A(x))[ρ] iff, for all w′ ≥ w and d ∈ D(w), w′  A [ρ(x → d)].
Indeed, they are “functionally equivalent” in the sense that soundness and
completeness hold in both cases.
We consider a formulation of Kripke semantics for sequent calculus built on
two kinds of judgements Γ ⊢ C and Γ ;A ⊢ C.
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Theorem 7 (Soundness). We have the following soundness.
1. if Γ ⊢ C then, for all w and ρ, w  Γ [ρ] implies w  C [ρ].
2. if Γ ;A ⊢ C then, for all w and ρ, (w  Γ [ρ] and w  A [ρ]) implies
w  C [ρ].
Proof. By a simultaneous induction on the deduction. ⊓⊔
4 Completeness
In this section we present a constructive completeness proof by constructing a
simple universal model. First we construct a universal model for which a strong
completeness holds.
Definition 8 (Universal Kripke model). The universal Kripke model U =
(Wu,⊑,u,Du, Vu) is defined as follows:
– Wu is the set of all contexts.
– ⊑ denotes the sub-context relation, i.e., Γ ⊑ Γ ′ holds when, for all A ∈ Γ ,
A ∈ Γ ′.
– Du consists of all closed terms.
– Vu(c) = c for all c ∈ C, and Vu(f)(t1, ..., tℓ) = f t1 · · · tℓ for all f ∈ F and
t1, ..., tℓ ∈ D
arity(f)
u
– Γ  P t1 · · · tℓ if Γ ⊢ P t1 · · · tℓ. It is obvious that Γ ⊑ Γ
′ and Γ ⊢ P t1 · · · tℓ
imply Γ ′ ⊢ t1 · · · tℓ.
Theorem 9 (Strong Completeness). Let Γ be a context of sentences, A a
formula, and ρ an association based on Ku such that FV (A) ⊆ dom(ρ). Then
1. If Γ  A [ρ] then Γ ⊢ A[.\ρ].
2. If, for all formula C and context Γ ′ such that Γ ⊑ Γ ′, Γ ′ ;A[.\ρ] ⊢ C implies
Γ ′ ⊢ C, then it holds that Γ  A [ρ].
Proof. Given the assumptions we prove both claims by a simultaneous induction
on the complexity of A. Note first that t [ρ] = t[.\ρ] for any term t occurring in
A since FV (A) ⊆ dom(ρ).
1. case: A is a prime formula. Then the first claim is obvious. For the second
claim take just Γ ′ := Γ and C := A[.\ρ].
2. case: A = A1 → A2.
– Assume Γ  (A1 → A2) [ρ]. To show Γ ⊢ A1[.\ρ] → A2[.\ρ], it suffices
to prove that A1[.\ρ], Γ ⊢ A2[.\ρ]. Note that the i.h. on A1 for the second
claim implies that A1[.\ρ], Γ  A2 [ρ]. Indeed, the premise of the second
claim holds trivially for any Γ ′ such that A1[.\ρ], Γ ⊑ Γ
′. This in turn
implies that A1[.\ρ], Γ  A2 [ρ] by the assumption. Then the i.h. on A2 for
the first claim leads to the goal.
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– Assume for all formula C and context Γ ′ such that Γ ⊑ Γ ′, Γ ′ ;A1[.\ρ] →
A2[.\ρ] ⊢ C implies Γ
′ ⊢ C. Assume furthermore that Γ ⊑ ∆ and ∆  A1 [ρ].
Then it remains to show ∆  A2 [ρ]. For that we apply the i.h. on A2 for
the second claim. Let C be a formula and ∆′ a context such that ∆ ⊑ ∆′,
assume ∆′ ;A2[.\ρ] ⊢ C. Note that ∆ ⊢ A1[.\ρ] by i.h. on A1 for the first
claim, hence ∆′ ⊢ A1[.\ρ] by the Weakening Lemma 2. By applying (→ℓ) we
get ∆′ ;(A1 → A2)[.\ρ] ⊢ C, so ∆
′ ⊢ C holds by the assumption.
3. case: A = ∀x B(x).
– Assume Γ  (∀x B) [ρ], i.e., for all closed term t, Γ  B [ρ(x 7→ t)]. To
show Γ ⊢ ∀x (B[.\ρ−x]), we need to prove that Γ ⊢ (B[.\ρ−x])[x\y] for some
variable y fresh in Γ and B[.\ρ−x]. For this we show Γ ⊢ (B[.\ρ−x])[x\c]
for some constant c and apply Lemma 4. Let c be a constant fresh in Γ and
B[.\ρ−x]. Note first that
(B[.\ρ−x])[x\c] = B[.\ρ−x(x 7→ c)] = B[.\ρ(x 7→ c)]
since the values of ρ are closed terms. However, Γ ⊢ B[.\ρ(x 7→ c)] follows
from the i.h. on B for the first claim.4
– Assume for all formula C and context Γ ′ such that Γ ⊑ Γ ′, it holds that
Γ ′ ;∀x (B[.\ρ−x]) ⊢ C implies Γ ′ ⊢ C. Given a closed term t, we have to
show that Γ  B [ρ(x 7→ t)]. In order to apply the i.h. on B for the second
claim assume furthermore that a formula C and a context Γ ′ are given
such that Γ ⊑ Γ ′ and Γ ′ ;B[.\ρ(x 7→ t)] ⊢ C. Note that B[.\ρ(x 7→ t)] =
B[.\ρ−x][x\t] since only closed terms are substituted. Therefore, it holds
that Γ ′ ;∀x (B[.\ρ−x]) ⊢ C. Then by the main assumption, Γ ′ ⊢ C. The i.h.
implies Γ  B [ρ(x 7→ t)]. ⊓⊔
Corollary 10. For any context Γ of sentences, Γ  Γ .
Proof. The second claim of the strong completeness and the rule (Contr) implies
that Γ  A for any A ∈ Γ . ⊓⊔
Theorem 11 (Completeness). Let Γ be a context of sentences and A a sen-
tence. If for all Kripke model K and a world w in K, w  Γ implies w  A, then
Γ ⊢ A.
Proof. It follows from the Strong Completeness and the fact that Γ  Γ , i.e.,
Γ ⊢ A iff Γ  A. ⊓⊔
Corollary 12. In the intuitionistic predicate logic with implication and univer-
sal quantification as sole connectives, the Kripke semantics with constant domain
is functionally equivalent to the usual Kripke semantics where the domain de-
pends on worlds in the sense that soundness and completeness hold in both cases.
4 One can see here that we don’t need any quantification in the definition of w 
∀x A(x).
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Proof. The exactly same proofs for soundness and completeness hold with the
usual Kripke models. ⊓⊔
Remark 13. We furthermore believe that, in the first-order predicate language
with →, ∧ and ∀ as sole connectives, the usual Kripke semantics is equivalent to
the Kripke semantics with constant domain in the sense that each usual Kripke
model can be transformed into an equivalent Kripke model with a constant
domain.
Remark 14. The completeness above easily extends to the case of the absurdity
connective
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ C
(⊥i)
using modified Kripke models with exploding nodes à la Veldman.
A modified Kripke model K = (W,≤,,D, V ) is defined as the (unmodified)
Kripke model, but with one change:
– w  (P t1 · · · tn)[ρ] iff (w  P (t1 [ρ]) · · · (tn [ρ]) or w  ⊥).
The universal Kripke model is defined in the same way as before, but with
the following additional clause:
– Γ  ⊥ iff Γ ⊢ ⊥.
Then nothing new is involved in the proof of completeness, the construction
proceeds as before. Note only that Γ ⊢ ⊥ implies Γ ⊢ A for any formula A.
On the other hand, if we include the absurdity rule and want to stick to the
(unmodified) Kripke semantics, we have to give up constructiveness in the proof
above. This is because we have to deal only with consistent context Γ , i.e., Γ 0 ⊥.
However, it is in general undecidable to check if a context is consistent or not. In
the implication case of the strong completeness, we had to make case distinction
between A1[.\ρ], Γ ⊢ ⊥ or not. This maybe is not so surprising because, in
the full first-order predicate logic, an intuitionistic completeness proof entails
Markov’s Principle, a non-intuitionistic principle, see Kreisel [13].
5 Cut admissibility
In this section we consider only sentences and contexts of sentences. Then the
cut-rule is admissible with/without (⊥i).
Theorem 15 (Cut admissibility). Γ ⊢ A and Γ ;A ⊢ B imply Γ ⊢ B.
Proof. By the Strong Completeness it suffices to show Γ  B. But this follows
from the Soundness applied on the two assumptions. Note also that ⊢ denotes a
cut-free system. ⊓⊔
9
6 Conclusion
We extended C. Coquand’s proof of soundness and completeness for implicative
natural deduction w.r.t. Kripke semantics [3] to the case of predicate logic with
implication and universal quantification. We could show that omitting disjunc-
tion and existential quantification from the intuitionistic first-order predicate
logic results, as it was the case for C. Coquand, in a significantly simple, intu-
itionistic completeness proof with respect to (also simplified) Kripke semantics.
The fact that all of the proofs given in this paper are intuitionistic has been
verified in the proof assistant Coq, cf. [14]. Indeed, the whole work is formalised,
so that we can get a mechanical process producing cut-free proofs. The formali-
sation is performed using cofinite quantification for fresh variables and a locally
named approach with two kinds of names for variables, one for free variables
and the other for binders. The formalisation is publicly available from the web
page of the first author, directory code/kripke.
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